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An Evaluation of Flight Safety Assessment and
Management to avoid Loss of Control during Takeoff
Sweewarman Balachandran∗ and Ella M. Atkins†
This paper illustrates the application of a novel flight safety assessment and management
(FSAM) system designed to assist a flight crew in avoiding loss of control (LOC) situations.
Nominally, this system serves as a passive monitor, but in high-risk situations, warnings and
ultimately override actions are initiated to recover a lower-risk state of operation. In this
work, FSAM is applied to the task of preserving safety during takeoff. This paper presents
logic and physics-based models that enable FSAM for takeoff. Case studies motivated
by takeoff accidents described in National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident
dockets are presented to evaluate how well FSAM is able to identify risk, generate context-
appropriate warnings, and override only when needed and only when such override will
critically reduce risk.
Nomenclature
EA Envelope Aware feedback controller
FDR Flight Data Recorder
FMS Flight Management System
FSAM Flight Safety Assessment and Management
LOC Loss of Control
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
α, β Angle of attack, side slip angle
δa, δr Aileron and rudder inputs
δBL, δBR Left and right brake inputs
Alg Longitudinal automaton
Alt Lateral-directional automaton
φ, θ, ψ Roll, pitch and yaw angles
g Acceleration due to gravity
x, y, z Aircraft position in the inertial frame
I. Introduction
Loss of control (LOC) is the leading cause of commercial aviation accidents today. Although commoncontributors exist, many causal factors that have historically led to LOC are a function of type of aircraft,
avionics design, crew behavior, and phase of flight.1 LOC during takeoff can be attributed to several factors
such as improper takeoff configuration, delayed execution of rejected takeoff procedures, engine failures during
takeoff, bird strikes, severe crosswinds, etc. Such circumstances may result in an aircraft stall on takeoff,
overshoot of the runway, or excursion off the side of the runway. Organizations such as the Flight Safety
Foundation2 have compiled accident statistics aimed at informing the aviation community of contributing
factors leading to loss of control during each phase of flight. Today, flight management decisions are made by
the flight crew, with the exception of certain envelope protection logic to prevent events such as pilot-induced
stall under nominal aircraft functionality and environmental conditions.3–5 During failure, damage, or other
exceptional events, decisions have to be made within a short time window. The wrong decisions could lead
to an accident. Current Flight Management Systems (FMS) provide substantial data to the flight crew.
Information about the flight plan, weather, local terrain, airports, fuel usage and more are available at the
press of a button. The crew can use all relevant data to make the appropriate decisions during in-flight
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emergencies although workload and information overload can be issues. These systems form a convenient
aid to the manual decision-making process. In case of emergencies, current systems may fail to provide
critical information. For example, current FMS were never designed to provide an assessment of the risk
associated with the current flight conditions and control choices, nor do they inform the flight crew about
possible actions that would improve safety of flight.4 Such information is vital to guide the flight crew in
the decision making process during emergencies particularly when real time decisions are required.
Several approaches that address one or more factors that contribute to LOC have been researched.
The notion of Safety Augmentation System for aircraft (SafAS) was introduced by Borst et al.6 SafAS
is an integrated and automated pilot support system that prevents aircraft from veering off course into
external hazards like unfavorable weather conditions. The notion of Icing Contamination Envelope Protection
(ICEPro) was proposed by Ratvasky et al.7 ICEPro helps identify degradations in airplane performance
and flying qualities resulting from ice contamination, providing cues to pilots. The concept of Aircraft
Integrated Resilient Safety Assurance and Failsafe Enhancement (AIRSAFE) was proposed by Belcastro
et al.8 AIRSAFE focuses on online modeling, safety assessment and resilient control in situations with
appreciable LOC risk.
The Flight Safety Assessment and Management (FSAM) system proposed in our previous publication9
is consistent with the ideals of AIRSAFE. FSAM is designed to constantly monitor flight conditions for
anomalies and to assess risk associated with the current flight conditions. A capable FSAM module im-
proves situational awareness of the flight crew with integrated rather than multiple disparate warnings
about potential hazards, and suggests specific recovery actions to the flight crew that will reduce risk. If the
flight crew does not respond with the appropriate control actions, FSAM continues to monitor and warn,
but it has the ability to override the flight crew in scenarios with high LOC risk.
This paper describes the physical and logic models enabling a prototype FSAM to monitor, warn, and
react as needed to enhance the safety of the takeoff phase of flight. Despite the safety-critical nature of the
takeoff phase, very little literature has been devoted towards safety management of takeoff. Srivatsan et al10
proposed a takeoff performance monitoring system that constantly monitors the ground roll performance
parameters. Milligan et al11 developed an instrument that predicts the nominal takeoff performance using
analytical models and aids the crew in making a safe GO-NO GO decision. For takeoff, LOC translates to a
situation in which the aircraft veers off the side or end of the runway, or leaves the ground but in a condition
(e.g., insufficient speed) that introduces substantial risk in the subsequent initial departure climb.
FSAM logic is based on timed automata12 to detect transitions representing nominal flight sequences
and transitions between anomalous states of varying risk levels. Timed automata provide tools for analyzing
important properties of the underlying real time system over all possible inputs. They are widely used in
model checking13 to verify properties such as correctness (satisfaction of design requirements), safety (nothing
bad will happen) and liveness (something good will eventually happen). The usage of timed automata for
modeling the FSAM logic has several advantages. Systems that are used on airplanes undergo a rigorous
testing process to ensure that the safety of the aircraft is not compromised. The timed automata framework
along with a wide variety of model checking tools, facilitates the safety verification process in a systematic
manner. Secondly, representation of the flight control logic as a directed graph also may facilitate flight
crew understanding of the Flight Management System and thus may contribute to a better decision making
process.
This paper focuses on development and evaluation of takeoff logic in a graphical form understandable
to flight crews as well as engineers and on characterizing the interactions between the logic module and the
physics of the takeoff model. Section II provides a brief overview of FSAM and introduces the syntax and
semantics of the timed automata framework. Section III presents the synthesis of a decision making logic
for the takeoff phase of flight using timed automata. Section IV illustrates an application of the logic models
with the help of a case study. Section IV also discusses the physics model and control law that we developed
for the case study. Finally, section V presents conclusions and extensions of the FSAM logic models for
takeoff.
II. Background
A. Flight Safety Assessment and Management (FSAM)
Flight Safety Assessment and Management (FSAM) is part of the Envelope Aware Flight Management
System (EA-FMS) proposed in our previous publication9 and shown in Fig 1. The EA-FMS consists of a suite
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of modules including: FSAM, Adaptive Planning and Guidance, Envelope Estimation, System Identification
and Adaptive control. These modules interact with each other as a single unified system with the ultimate
goal of preventing LOC. FSAM is the high level decision making module which primarily monitors the aircraft
systems, instruments, pilot, autopilot control inputs, and activates warnings under off nominal conditions
(i.e., off nominal conditions not identified by conventional flight management computers). FSAM issues
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Figure 2. FSAM architecture
B. Deterministic Timed Büchi Automaton
A Deterministic Timed Büchi Automaton (DTBA) is a variant of the timed transition table/timed automa-
ton.12 A timed automaton can be viewed as an abstraction of a real-time physical system. A DTBA is
formally represented as a tuple (Σ, S, S0, C, F,E), where
• Σ is a finite alphabet.
• S is a finite set of states.
• S0 ⊂ S is an initial state (| S0 |= 1).
• C is a finite set of clocks.
• E ⊆ S × S × Σ× 2C × Φ(C) is the set of all transitions. An edge < s, s′, a, λ, δ > represents a unique
transition from a state s to a state s′ triggered by the action/event/input symbol a. λ ⊆ C is the set
of clocks to be reset on this transition, and δ is a clock constraint over C.
• F ⊆ S is a set of final states.
The finite alphabet Σ consists of a non empty set of symbols. Each symbol σi ∈ Σ, (i ∈ N) characterizes an
observable event of a process/system. A sequence of symbols is called a word or string σ. A set of strings
chosen from the given alphabet defines a language L. A time sequence τ is defined as a sequence of strictly
monotonically increasing time values τi (i ∈ R) . A timed word (σ, τ) is a sequence of ordered pairs (σi, τi)
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which is interpreted as the occurrence of the word σi at time τi. The states in S are chosen to reflect values
of the various variables of the system that are of interest. States help to “remember” different configurations
of the system. The behavior of the system can be represented by defining runs of the timed automaton. A
run r, denoted by (s̄, v̄), of a timed automaton over a timed word (σ, τ) is a sequence of the form










A run logs the sequence of states si and the value of the clocks vi at the transitions as the physical system
executes its tasks.
III. Deterministic Timed Büchi Automata for Takeoff
Takeoff and landing are the highest-risk phases of flight. Contributing factors to loss of control during
the takeoff phase have been identified in the literature.2 For an aircraft with a given takeoff configuration
(takeoff weight, flap/slat settings), several airspeed checkpoints called V-speeds14 are established to guide
the flight crew in making the appropriate decisions for a safe takeoff/rejected takeoff. The most important
V speed is V1, the decision speed by which the flight crew must commit to or reject a takeoff. The flight
crew may need to reject a takeoff due to several factors such as single/multiple engine failure, tire burst or
a runway incursion.15 A rejected takeoff initiated after V1 will leave the aircraft with insufficient runway
length remaining to stop safely. VR represents the speed at which the pilot flying (PF) can safely rotate
(pull back on the control column/stick) to attain a climb attitude. A premature rotation initiated before
VR can result in a takeoff stall due to insufficient lift.
16
In this section, we present automata that represent a manually constructed strategy to identify and
mitigate serious risk due to LOC during takeoff. These strategies are formulated based on a rigorous
analysis of numerous aviation accident surveys, accident/incident reports, flight data obtained from the
NTSB accident database, aircraft operating manuals, pilot handbooks, checklist procedures and flight control
laws from the literature.3–5,16,17 The overall takeoff logic is decomposed into two automata for simplicity.
Fig 3 illustrates the longitudinal automaton and Fig 4 illustrates the lateral automaton. We assume that
the longitudinal and lateral states of the aircraft can be controlled separately.
A. Longitudinal Automaton
The longitudinal automaton governs the decision making process with respect to the longitudinal dynamics
of the aircraft during the takeoff phase. It is designed to prevent events that could severely affect the
ground roll performance of the aircraft, including inappropriate crew inputs such as improper rejected takeoff
procedures and improper rotations. Each state of the automaton captures the critical V speed thresholds
described above.
We represent the longitudinal (lg) automaton (Alg) as the tuple (Σlg, Slg, Slg0, Clg, Flg, Elg) where
Σlg = {Vmcg, V1, VR, Vlof , V2, Vfp, Tidle, Tmax, c, c′, e, e′, θ̂, θ̄} (1)
Slg = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8, s9, s10, s11, s12, s13, s14, s15} (2)
Slg0 = {s1} (3)
Clg = {t1, t2} (4)
Flg = {s1, s13, s14, s15} (5)
The transitions Elg are illustrated as edges in the directed graph (Fig 3). The definition of each alphabet
symbol in the set Σlg is provided in Table 1. Table 2 provides descriptions of each state in Slg. In Fig 1,
the circles in the directed graph represent a state of the aircraft. A state s in the longitudinal automaton is
defined as the quadruple [V̄,M,R,P] where V̄ represents an airspeed range and takes values as shown below
V̄ ∈ {v̄i}, i = 1, .., 8 (6)
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v̄1 = {V ∈ R | V = 0} (7)
v̄2 = {V ∈ R | 0 < V ≤ Vmcg} (8)
v̄3 = {V ∈ R | Vmcg < V ≤ V1} (9)
v̄4 = {V ∈ R | V1 < V ≤ VR} (10)
v̄5 = {V ∈ R | VR < V ≤ Vlof} (11)
v̄6 = {V ∈ R | Vlof < V ≤ V2} (12)
v̄7 = {V ∈ R | V2 < V ≤ Vfp} (13)
v̄8 = {V ∈ R | V > Vfp} (14)
M represents the control mode.
M∈ {p̄, āp} (15)
Here p̄ denotes that the pilot is in command of the aircraft and āp denotes that an “envelope-aware” autopilot
system is in command of the aircraft that is sufficiently adaptable or situationally aware to be capable of
recovering from the LOC situation. R represents the risk level associated with the current state.
R ∈ {ε, low, med, high} (16)
ε represents a zero risk state. “low, med and high” represent low, medium and high risk states respectively.
P represents a flag,
P ∈ {0, 1} (17)
where P =1 represents a condition where continuing takeoff is no longer safe because of inappropriate con-
figuration/component failures. P =0 represents a condition where it is safe to continue takeoff.
Table 1. Alphabet symbols for the Takeoff automata
Alphabet (Σ) Description
Vmcg Minimum controllable ground speed with one engine inoperative
V1 Takeoff decision speed (Go-No Go speed)
VR Rotation speed
Vlof Liftoff speed
V2 Takeoff safety speed
Vfp Minimum flap retraction speed
Tmax Maximum takeoff thrust setting
Tidle Idle thrust setting
c Aircraft configured for takeoff
c’ Improper takeoff configuration
e Envelope protection de-activated
e’ Envelope protection activated
θ̂ Positive pitch attitude
θ̄ Maximum allowable pitch attitude reached during rotation
d′ Crossing 1st directional threshold
d̄ Crossing 2nd directional threshold
The longitudinal automaton starts initially in a state of rest(s1). If the aircraft is configured for takeoff (c)
and takeoff thrust is established (Tmax), the aircraft starts accelerating down the runway and the automaton
progresses through the various states sequenced by the V speeds. Thus, the top row of states in Fig 3
represent the nominal transitions the automaton goes through in a typical takeoff phase. At subsequently
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higher speeds, the logic monitors the crew inputs to avoid scenarios leading to premature rotation and tail
strikes (s4 and s5). After liftoff, conventional envelope protection features such as angle of attack and over-
speed protections become active.3,4 Pushing the aircraft to the limits of the envelope during the 1st and 2nd
climb segments (s6,s7) leads to a temporary override where control is transferred to the “envelope aware”
controller (s11,s12) which prevents the aircraft from crossing envelope boundaries. FSAM reverts control
to the flight crew after the aircraft is stabilized on climbout. After the first and second departure climb
segments, the takeoff automaton terminates in the climb phase (s15) and the next logic model for the climb
phase engages. If the aircraft was inappropriately configured for takeoff, the automaton goes into the takeoff
configuration warning state (s8). s8 is a state where FSAM issues warnings to the flight crew, alerting them
to the risk associated with the inappropriate configuration. If no further action is taken, the automaton goes
into the abort state (s13) where it safely rejects the takeoff. This will be safe but surprising to a crew that
did not heed warnings.
Table 2. Examples of state representations
Alg States Representation Alt States Representation
s1 [v̄1, p̄, ε, 0] s
′
1 [v̄1, ȳ1, ψ̄1, ḡ1, p̄, ε, 0]
s2 [v̄2, p̄, ε, 0] s
′
2 [v̄2, ȳ1, ψ̄1, ḡ1, p̄, ε, 0]
s3 [v̄3, p̄, ε, 0] s
′
3 [v̄3, ȳ1, ψ̄1, ḡ1, p̄, ε, 0]
s4 [v̄4, p̄, ε, 0] s
′
4 [v̄4, ȳ1, ψ̄1, ḡ1, p̄, ε, 0]
s5 [v̄5, p̄, ε, 0] s
′
5 [v̄5, ȳ1, ψ̄1, ḡ1, p̄, ε, 0]
s6 [v̄6, p̄, ε, 0] s
′
6 [v̄6, ȳ1, ψ̄1, ḡ1, p̄, ε, 0]
s7 [v̄7, p̄, ε, 0] s
′
7 [v̄7, ȳ1, ψ̄1, ḡ1, p̄, ε, 0]
s8 [v̄2, p̄,med, 0] s
′
8 [v̄2, ȳ2, ψ̄2, ḡ1, āp,med, 0]
s9 [v̄4, āp, low, 0] s
′
9 [v̄3, ȳ2, ψ̄2, ḡ1, āp,med, 0]
s10 [v̄5, āp, low, 0] s
′
10 [v̄4, ȳ2, ψ̄2, ḡ1, āp,med, 0]
s11 [v̄6, āp, low, 0] s
′
11 [v̄5, ȳ2, ψ̄1, ḡ1, āp,med, 0]
s12 [v̄7, āp, low, 0] s
′
12 [v̄6, ȳ2, ψ̄2, ḡ1, āp,med, 0]
s13 [v̄3, āp,med, 1] s
′
13 [v̄7, ȳ2, ψ̄2, ḡ1, āp,med, 0]
s14 [v̄3, p̄, ε, 1] s
′
14 [v̄2,3, ȳ3, ψ̄3, ḡ1, āp,med, 1]
s15 [v̄8, p̄, ε, 0] s
′
15 [v̄8, ȳ1, ψ̄1, ḡ1, p̄, ε, 0]
Rest Grnd roll - 1 Grnd roll - 2 Grnd roll - 3 Rotate 1
st Seg Climb 2nd Seg Climb
1st Seg Climb 2nd Seg Climb


























































































































Figure 3. Timed automata for longitudinal takeoff dynamics
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Figure 4. Timed automata for lateral-directional takeoff dynamics
B. Lateral Automaton
The lateral takeoff logic aims to prevent directional control losses during the initial ground roll. Directional
control losses can be caused due to severe cross winds/gusts, engine thrust asymmetry, or mistrimmed rudder.
Each state imposes bounds on the lateral position of the aircraft from the runway center line, deviations in
aircraft’s heading from runway heading, and the lateral acceleration of the aircraft (see Fig 5).
The lateral (lt) automaton Alt is represented by the tuple (Σlt, Slt, Slt0, Clt, Flt, Elt).
Σlt = {Vmcg, V1, VR, Vlof , V2, Vfp, Tidle, Tmax, c, c′, e, e′, d′, d̄} (18)
Slt = {s′1, s′2, s′3, s′4, s′5, s′6, s′7, s′8, s′9, s′10, s′11, s′12, s′13, s′14, s′15} (19)
Slt0 = {s′1} (20)
Clt = {t3, t4} (21)
Flt = {s′1, s′14, s′15} (22)
Each state s′ is defined as the 7 tuple [V̄, Ȳ, Ψ̄, Ḡ,M,R,P]. V̄, M, R and P are defined as in Eqns
(6)-(17). Ȳ represents a range of cross track errors (lateral distance away from the runway center line) as
shown below.
Ȳ ∈ {ȳi}, i = 1, 2, 3 (23)
ȳ1 = {y ∈ R | | y |≤| y1 |} (24)
ȳ2 = {y ∈ R | | y1 |<| y |≤| y2 |} (25)
ȳ3 = {y ∈ R | | y |>| y2 |} (26)
y1 and y2 represent an inner and outer threshold, respectively (see Fig 5). Ψ̄ represents an inertial heading
range
Ψ̄ ∈ {ψ̄i}, i = 1, 2, 3 (27)
ψ̄1 ={ψ ∈ [−π, π] | | ψ |<| ψ1 |} (28)
ψ̄2 ={ψ ∈ [−π, π] | | ψ1 |≤| ψ |≤| ψ2 |} (29)
ψ̄3 ={ψ ∈ [−π, π] | | ψ |>| ψ2 |} (30)
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Here ψ1 and ψ2 represent bounds on the aircraft’s heading (see Fig 5). Ḡ represents a lateral acceleration
range
Ḡ ∈ {ḡi}, i = 1, 2 (31)
ḡ1 = {ÿ ∈ R | | ÿ |≤| ÿ1 |} (32)
ḡ2 = {ÿ ∈ R | | ÿ |>| ÿ1 |} (33)
Figure 5. Lateral constraints
Directional control issues during the takeoff roll often arise due to the violation of one or more of the
bounds specified above. A directional control loss may result from a pilot induced oscillation (PIO) which
eventually leads to the aircraft veering off the side of the runway as in the FL1404 case study discussed
below. If one or more of these thresholds were to be violated (d′), FSAM logic transfers control to the
envelope-aware controller which then attempts to bring the aircraft within the specified bounds. If the
envelope-aware control authority is not able to maintain the aircraft within the specified bounds (d̄), then
FSAM aborts the takeoff before the aircraft veers of the runway.
The overall automaton for the takeoff phase comprises the parallel composition of both Alg and Alt. We
denote this parallel composition as Alg||Alt. A parallel composition denotes the concurrent execution of the
two automata as the aircraft executes a takeoff. Although the two automata (Alg and Alt) have a similar
structure, they may not have the same transitions. For example, in case of an imminent tail strike during
rotation, Alg transitions from s5
θ̄→ s10
Vlof→ s6 and Alt transitions from s′5
Vlof→ s′6.
IV. Application of FSAM to prevent LOC during takeoff
In this section we present a case study that illustrates the application of FSAM’s timed automata models
to prevent LOC during a takeoff roll.
A. Case study: Continental Airlines FL1404
In December 2008, a Boeing 737 (B737) aircraft failed to complete an attempted takeoff from Denver
International Airport.17 During the initial ground roll, the aircraft experienced severe crosswinds (above
35 knots) which pushed the aircraft towards the side of the runway. The pilot was not able to maintain
directional control of the aircraft with the appropriate stick and rudder inputs and so the aircraft veered off
the side of the runway. There were no fatalities but the aircraft was severely damaged. Fig 6 illustrates select
parameters extracted from the Flight Data Recorder (FDR), obtained from the NTSB accident database,
to provide a graphical understanding of the events that led to the accident starting from the takeoff roll.
The graph shows the crosswind speed, the rudder inputs from the pilot and aircraft heading during the first
14 seconds of the takeoff roll. It is evident from Fig 6 that after 10 seconds, the aircraft deviates from the
runway heading (heading deviates from 00 to −300) when the crosswinds reach over 30 knots. The NTSB
determined the probable cause of the accident as “The captain’s cessation of rudder input, which was needed
to maintain directional control of the airplane, about four seconds before the excursion, when the airplane
encountered strong gusty crosswind that exceeded the captain’s training and experience.” This is reflected in
8 of 16
































































Fig 6 as it is evident at around 7 seconds, the pilot relaxes the rudder pedals after the large rudder input at
roughly 5 seconds.








































Figure 6. Parameters obtained from Flight Data Recorder(FDR)17
The aim of this case study is to analyze the behavior of FSAM’s timed automata models in response to
a LOC scenario, similar to that of FL1404 described above. We developed the following models, described
below, to analyze the interactions of FSAM’s timed automata with the aircraft dynamics and flight control
laws.
• A physics-based model of the takeoff phase to simulate the aircraft’s dynamics during the takeoff
ground roll and also its responses to crosswinds and gusts.
• A nonlinear controller that is capable of tracking the runway center line in the presence of strong
crosswinds to demonstrate FSAM’s resilient override capabilities.
B. Takeoff Dynamics
This section discusses the development of the mathematical model that describes the dynamics during the
takeoff phase. Modeling the ground roll dynamics of the aircraft requires the knowledge of the reaction forces
and moments exerted by the ground on the airframe18 as well as aerodynamic forces that become significant
as airspeed progressively increases during the takeoff roll.
The aircraft is considered as a spring-mass-damper model.19,20 The massless springs and damping
units represent the oleo struts of the nose, left and right landing gear assemblies. Based on knowledge
of inertial position and velocity of the center of gravity (CG) and attitude of the aircraft, one can estimate
the compression and rate of compression of the oleo struts and thus compute the normal forces and moments
exerted by the ground on the airframe.
Assuming that the three struts are exactly vertical, the normal force Fz exerted by the ground on the
aircraft (expressed in the inertial frame) is given by
Fzi = −Kizi − Ciżi i = Nw, Lw, Rw (34)
Ki and Ci are the spring constants and the damping coefficients of the nose, left and right oleo struts of
the landing gear. z and ż are the compression and rate of compression of the oleo struts expressed in the
inertial frame. Nw, Lw and Rw represent the nose, left and right wheels. The gear model is shown in Fig 7.
The wheels experience friction due to contact between the tire and runway surface. We assume that the
wheels are rigid to simplify the friction model.21 The longitudinal force acting on the wheels are due to the




























































































Figure 7. Tri-cycle landing gear configuration
Vx is the translational velocity of the wheel in the longitudinal direction and ω is angular velocity of the
wheel. R0 is the radius of the wheel.
The coefficient of friction µ is related to the longitudinal slip ratio σs of the wheels by the empirical
formula known as the “magic formula”.22
µ = D̄sin(C̄tan−1(B̄σs)) (36)
Here B̄,C̄ and D̄ are constants pertaining to the runway surface and are obtained from experimental
data. The longitudinal frictional force Fx exerted by the ground on the wheel is given by:
Fxi = µiFzi i = Nw, Lw, Rw (37)
The wheels also experience side force Fy due to lateral slip of the wheels. The lateral slip ratio (αs) of







i = Lw, Rw (38)







Here u,v are the x,y components of the aircraft’s velocity in the body frame respectively. lyi and lxi are
distances of the wheels from the CG as shown in Fig 7. δsteer is the nose wheel steering angle. The side






i = Nw, Lw, Rw (40)
Here Fymax is the maximum attainable side force at the optimal slip angle αopt. The expressions for
Fymax and αopt are given by
19,20
FymaxNw = − 3.53× 10−6F 2zNw + 8.33× 10
−1FzNw (41)
FymaxLw,Rw = − 7.39× 10−7F 2zLw,Rw + 5.11× 10
−1FzLw,Rw (42)
αsoptN = 3.52× 10
−9F 2zNw + 2.8× 10
−5FzNw + 13.8 (43)
αsoptL,R = 1.34× 10
−10F 2zLw,Rw + 1.06× 10
−5FzLw,Rw + 6.72 (44)
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The net ground reaction force components Fx, Fy and Fz can be computed as shown in Eqns (34),(37)
and (40). The moment components Mx,My,Mz due to the reaction forces can be obtained by taking the
product of the reaction forces and the respective moment arms about the center of gravity.
The net ground reaction forces and moments are transformed into the aircraft body frame. The trans-
formed forces and moments can then be added to the conventional six degree of freedom aircraft equations
of motion23 to obtain the complete nonlinear set of equations that simulate the takeoff phase of flight. The
takeoff equations of motion (expressed in body frame) are as follows:
• Translational Momentum
m(u̇− vr + wq) = − (sinθ)mg − (cosβ)(cosα)D + (sinα)L+ (cosφT )FT + Fxgear (45)
m(v̇ + ur − wp) = (sinφ)(cosθ)mg − (sinβ)D + Fygear (46)
m(ẇ − uq + vp) = (cosφ)(cosθ)mg − (cosβ)(sinα)D − (cosα)L − (sinφT )FT + Fzgear (47)
• Rotational Momentum
Ixxṗ+ (Izz − Iyy)qr − Ixz(ṙ + pq) = Laero + Lthrust + Lgear (48)
Iyy q̇ + (Ixx − Izz)pr + Ixz(p2 − r2) =Maero +Mthrust +Mgear (49)
Izz ṙ + (Iyy − Ixx)pq + Ixz(qr − ṗ) =Naero +Nthrust +Ngear (50)
• Wheel Dynamics
IwN ˙ωN = FxNRwheelN (51)
IwL ω̇L = FxLRwheelL + τbrakeL (52)
IwR ω̇R = FxRRwheelR + τbrakeR (53)
Here u, v and w are the components of translational velocity in the aircraft body frame. p, q and r are
angular rates. φ, θ and ψ are the roll, pitch and yaw attitude angles. L, D are lift and drag. FT is the
thrust force and φT is the angle the thrust vector makes with the longitudinal axis. L,M and N are the roll,
pitch and yaw moments. Ixx, Iyy, Izz and Ixz are the moments of inertia of the aircraft. Iw is the moment of
inertia of the wheel. Rwheel is the radius of the wheel. τbrake is the braking torque produced on the wheels
due to the application of brakes. Eqns (51)-(53) model the effect of differential braking during the ground
roll.18
C. Controller Design
This section describes the development of a lateral-directional controller for the takeoff phase. We are
interested in demonstrating loss of control prevention due to directional control issues as in FL1404 so we
focus on the development of a lateral-directional controller to track the runway center line in the presence of
disturbances such as crosswinds and gusts. We assume that the longitudinal control of the aircraft is open
loop.
An aircraft flying at a trim condition is in equilibrium so one can compute a linearized feedback control
law to achieve the required closed loop behavior. However, an aircraft accelerating down the runway during
the takeoff phase is not in equilibrium. Moreover, due to increasing airflow over the control surfaces, the
effectiveness of the control surfaces is not constant. Friction between the wheels and the runway surfaces
adds further non-linearities into the model. All these factors make it difficult to design a linear control law
that would achieve a tracking behavior to stay on the runway center line. However, if one assumes that there
are no disturbances (crosswinds), and the aircraft’s wheels do not have lateral slip, the aircraft would remain
in equilibrium with respect to the lateral axis (i.e if the aircraft starts on the runway center line, it will stay
on the center line if there are no disturbances). Thus, the aircraft’s lateral dynamics can be approximated
by linearizing Eqns (46), (48) and (50) about the lateral equilibrium.
The lateral-directional model obtained after linearization is dependent on the forward speed of the aircraft.
Thus, for each forward speed, one can find a linear lateral-directional model. This implies that there is a
continuum of linear lateral-directional models that describe the behavior of the accelerating aircraft about
the lateral equilibrium. For takeoff, we are interested in the airspeed range [0, Vfp] (i.e. from rest till the flap
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retraction speed after lift off). We divide this airspeed range into n = 10 partitions. We select the mean value
of the airspeed u in each partition and then linearize Eqns (46), (48) and (50) about the lateral equilibrium
v = 0, p = 0, r = 0 for the selected mean airspeed u. We assume that this linearized model approximates
the lateral-directional dynamics of the aircraft within the selected partition. Informally, this approach can
be considered as taking a snapshot of the longitudinal dynamics at various locations in the ground roll and
then computing the linear lateral-directional models for each snapshot. We obtain n piecewise affine linear
lateral-directional models of the form shown below.
δẋ =Aiδx+Biδui, i = 1, .., n
δx represents perturbation from the equilibrium and δu is the input.
δx = [δv, δp, δr, δφ, δψ, δy]
δu = [δa, δr]
A control law developed for the non-linear plant (aircraft) using the above linear models is guaranteed to
stabilize the equilibrium of the plant as long as the perturbations acting on the aircraft are small. However,
to stabilize the aircraft on the runway center line in the presence of large crosswinds, we need a robust
controller that can handle large uncertainties. We use a Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR)24 approach to
design a control law that tracks the runway center line. An LQR controller guarantees certain stability
margins and is robust to some uncertainties. For each pair (Ai, Bi) i = 1, ..., n we compute a state feedback





T R̄iδu i = 1, ..., n
where Q̄i and R̄i are weighting matrices that impose penalties on the states and controls respectively. We
then use all the δui, i = 1, ..., n to control the nonlinear aircraft plant model described in Eqns (45)-(53) by
scheduling the gains according to the airspeed partitions. As a lateral control law, δui only provides control
inputs for the ailerons and rudder. We also use a PID controller to control the differential braking action to
help achieve runway center line tracking. Fig 8 illustrates the takeoff control architecture. From the results
illustrated in the following section, it can be seen that the controller developed above is indeed robust and
can stabilize the aircraft on the runway center line in the presence of a 40 knot steady crosswind.

















Figure 8. Envelope Aware (EA) controller architecture used on the non-linear aircraft plant
D. Simulation Setup and Results
Using the above non-linear aircraft plant and controller, we then simulated the accident scenario with data
obtained from FL1404’s Flight Data Recorder (FDR). We used rudder and aileron inputs from the FDR to
represent the pilot’s inputs. We extracted crosswind data from the NTSB data report to simulate similar
environmental conditions. We did not have access to an exact B737 simulation model. We used parameters
that approximate B737 characteristics. We also approximated runway surface and friction characteristics.
Nevertheless, this simulation supports credible analysis of the behavior of an aircraft subjected to heavy
crosswinds and gusts during a takeoff ground roll. Fig 9 illustrates the simulation framework in which we
augment the FSAM modules with the aircraft model and the controller.
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Figure 9. Simulation framework
Parameters of our aircraft model closely resemble the physical properties (mass, inertia, wingspan and
mean aerodynamic chord) of a B737 type aircraft. Based on performance calculations, the following V speeds
were chosen for the automata; Vmcg = 60 knots, V1 = 140 knots, VR = 180 knots, Vlof = 200 knots, V2 = 220
knots, Vfp = 230 knots. We chose the following thresholds for the lateral automaton; y1 = 30 m and
ψ1 = 22.92
0 (inner thresholds), y2 = 45 m, and ψ2 = 28.65
0 (outer thresholds). Figures 10 and 11 illustrate
the results of our simulation. Figure 10 illustrates a continued takeoff sequence of an aircraft subjected to
a crosswind similar to the one experienced by FL1404. Here, FSAM identifies that the flight crew is no
longer able to achieve directional control of the aircraft when the aircraft violates the inner threshold in
lateral displacement (shown in the second graph on the left in Fig 10); i.e transitions s′3
d′→ s′9 in Alt. It then
overrides the flight crew by transferring control authority to the envelope-aware controller which then drives
the aircraft back towards the runway center line. After the aircraft lifts off the ground and is stabilized on
the initial departure climb segment, control is reverted back to the pilot; i.e s′12
e→ s′6. The aircraft starts
to drift due to the crosswind after control is transferred back to the pilot (after t = 40s). This is due to the
fact that the pilot’s rudder input is zero after t = 40s. The above decisions made by FSAM are important
because by overriding the pilot, the controller helps make the appropriate corrections to the flight trajectory
so that the aircraft can takeoff safely.
Fig 11 illustrates a similar scenario, but this time tighter thresholds are placed on the lateral displacement
and heading to reflect a narrower runway: y1 = 20 m and ψ1 = 17.19
0 (inner thresholds), y2 = 30 m and
ψ2 = 28.65
0 (outer thresholds). Here, FSAM first identifies that the flight crew has lost directional control
(violation of inner threshold in heading) and it transfers control to the envelope-aware controller; i.e s′3
d′→ s′9.
FSAM then identifies that the envelope-aware controller is also not able to gain directional control; Fig 11
shows that the controller is not able to prevent the lateral position of the aircraft from crossing the outer
threshold. Thus a transition to the abort state is made in an attempt to reject the takeoff safely; i.e.
s′9
d̄→ s′14. In the abort state, the controller sets the throttle to idle. While decelerating, the controller still
tries to track the runway center line. In this scenario, FSAM has successfully prevented major excursions
off the side of the runway even though it did not continue the takeoff. In Fig 12 we present a graphical
representation of runs of the automata for the case illustrated in Fig 11. The shaded states indicate the
sequence of states the automata visit during an execution.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a detailed description of FSAM’s automata for the takeoff phase of
flight. These automata address only a very small subset of factors contributing to LOC during takeoff. The
goal of this paper was not to develop a complete set of automata that address every possible contributing
factor, but to illustrate a systematic approach to deal with LOC contributing factors. For a comprehensive
safety management system, events such as engine failures, instrument failures and actuator failures have
to be addressed simultaneously. The influence of other variables such as extreme weather conditions, air
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Figure 10. Continued takeoff after an override


























































































































































































Figure 11. Aborting takeoff before LOC
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Figure 12. Concurrent execution of the two automata for the aborted takeoff scenario
traffic, pilot experience, workload and crew resource management have to be considered as well. The current
hierarchical architecture of FSAM can be expanded by incorporating sub-automata that address the various
events just mentioned, as illustrated in our previous publication.9
The simulations presented in this paper illustrate the utility of a deterministic, automata-driven Flight
Safety Assessment and Management system. These simulations were performed using pilot input data
obtained from the FDR of FL1404. Of course, human pilot in the loop simulations and numerous other
issues in validation, verification, and pilot acceptance must be addressed before even the “simple” override
logic presented here will be certified for operation. The goal in this paper was to present an intuitive,
deterministic logic model that ultimately can be certified once accepted as reducing rather than increasing
risk. As a future research direction, we will formally verify the above automata using well-established tools
in model checking to ensure that these logic models meet certain safety and liveness properties. Also, we
will relax the notion of determinism and consider the effects of uncertainties in the decision making process.
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